We study a complete information preemption game in continuous time. A nite number of rms decide when to make an irreversible, observable investment. Upon investment, a rm receives ow pro ts which decrease in the number of rms that have invested. The cost of investment declines over time exogenously. We characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome, which is unique up to a permutation of players. When the preemption race among late investors is suf ciently intense, the preemption incentive for earlier investors disappears, and two or more investments occur at the same time. We identify a suf cient condition in terms of model parameters: clustering of investments occurs if the ow pro ts from consecutive investments are suf ciently close. This shows how clustering can occur in the absence of coordination failures, informational spillovers or positive payoff externalities.
Introduction
Consider a game of timing in which players have to decide when to make an investment. The cost of investing declines over time. A rm earns a positive pro t ow upon investment, but pro t ows decline in the number of investors. This is a preemption game: Delay exogenously increases payoffs through lower investment cost, but each player also has an incentive to invest early, because there is an early mover advantage.
In a preemption game, investment by a player reduces the post-investment ow pro t for later investors, and hence the incentive of the remaining players to invest. Therefore, our intuition lets us expect a period of delay until the next investment occurs. This intuition is correct for the case of two players (Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) ) but, as we show in this paper, may fail otherwise.
We study a general N -Player investment preemption game and identify a mechanism that generates clustering of investment times: When the preemption race
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if investment times are generated by a preemption game and clustering is observed, a bound on the decline in pro ts due to rival investment can be calculated. 2 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Immediately below we dicuss the related literature. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3.1 illustrates the benchmark case of a two-player game, in which investments are never clustered in equilibrium. Section 3.2 describes the mechanism that generates clustering, in the context of the three-player game. Section 3.3 characterizes the unique equilibrium outcome of the N -player game. Section 3.4 derives a suf cient condition on the primitives of the model for the presence of a cluster of two or more investments. Section 4 concludes.
Related literature
Seminal papers by Reinganum (1981a) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) study technology adoption games of unobservable and observable actions with two players respectively. Reinganum (1981b) derives the equilibrium of a game of technology adoption with N rms and unobservable actions. Anderson and Engers (1994) study a modi ed game where there is a time window in which players decide to act and payoffs of a static game played only among those who have acted are collected after expiration of this time window. In two related papers, Smith (2008, 2010) analyze a timing game with a general payoff structure and more than two players. See Park and Smith (2008) for the case of unobservable actions, and Park and Smith (2010) for the case of observable actions and a continuum of players. Goetz (1999) discusses the case of a continuum of rms where the preemption motive is absent. Hoppe (2002) surveys the extensive literature on technology preemption games, changing the assumptions on the information structure or the payoff structure. Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2005) study a version of a two-player game with a general deterministic payoff structure. More recently, Hopenhayn and Squintani (2011) consider a game with privately observed payoffs. Bobtcheff and Mariotti (2011) study a game with uncertainty regarding the presence of a competitor.
We rely on the equilibrium property of rent equalization to characterize conditions for clustering. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) show that in the technology adoption game with observable actions and two players rent equalization must hold. They also illustrate why it may not hold with more than two players. The case of two players is also studied in Gilbert and Harris (1984) when analyzing a game where rms engage in lumpy capacity investments. While positive pro ts are earned with unobservable actions, they show that there exists a class of subgame perfect equilibria in the game with two players and observable actions where rents are fully dissipated. They conjecture that their arguments extend to the N -player game.
2. Identifying clusters empirically may be dif cult because data often come in yearly intervals as it is the case in the empirical literature mentioned above. Increasing access to administrative data sources alleviates this problem. For example Kaniovski and Peneder (2008) use social security data to identify the date of hire of the rst employee as the day of entry of a rm. Mills (1988) shows that rent dissipation in a game of preemptive investment depends crucially on the ability of rms to make costless credible threats. If credible threats are costly, for example because investment must be made in temporarily separated steps, rents are not dissipated and pro ts almost as high as monopoly pro ts can be achieved in equilibrium. Mills (1991) analyzes a multiplayer model of lumpy capacity investment very close to ours. Arguing that rent equalization must hold in equilibrium, he discusses the welfare implications of preemptive investment, and in particular the possibility that it leads to excessive and/or premature entry. Our paper contributes to this literature by establishing the possibility of clusters of investments, investigating the mechanism behind them, and their implications for the interpretation of industry data.
Strategic investment has also been studied in a real options framework. Greater uncertainty over the pro tability of investment increases the option value of waiting and thus the tendency to delay investment. For recent examples see Weeds (2002) and references therein, as well as the survey by Hoppe (2002) . In independent work, Bouis, Huisman and Kort (2009) study dynamic investment in oligopoly in a real options framework and nd comparative statics result that are closely related to ours. 3 The real options approach allows aggregate uncertainty in the payoff process, but is restricted to a speci c payoff growth process for payoffs (a Brownian motion with drift).
Bulow and Klemperer (1994) study a model with a seller who has multiple identical objects and multiple buyers with independent private values. They show that if buyers' valuations are not too different, frenzies of simultaneous purchases can occur because a purchase by a buyer increases the remaining buyers' willingness to pay. In our model, investment by a player lowers the ow pro t achievable by the next investor. Nonetheless, clusters are possible if this decrease is suf ciently small, and the ensuing preemption race to take the role of the next investor is suf ciently intense.
Model

The Investment Game
We analyze an in nite horizon dynamic game in continuous time. At time 0, a new investment opportunity becomes available, and N identical players ( rms) have to decide if, and when, to seize this opportunity. The investment opportunity can be interpreted as adoption of a new technology, or entry into a new market. Investment is observable and irreversible.
The set of rms is denoted by N D ¹1; : : : ; N º and a single rm is denoted by i 2 N .
The model corresponds to the one studied by Reinganum (1981a Reinganum ( , 1981b and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) except for the following: Until a rm invests, it receives constant ow of pro ts 0 which we normalize to zero. This assumption that preinvestment payoffs are independent of the number of earlier investments will be essential for obtaining a unique outcome in each subgame, which in turn guarantees rent equalization. 4 Upon investment, a rm earns ow pro ts of .m/, where m is the number of rms that have already invested at a given point in time. Let D ..1/; .2/; : : : ; .N // denote a ow pro t structure.
Let c.t/ be the present value at time zero of the cost of investing at time t. If the outcome of the game is that the vector of investment times is T j , for j D 1; : : : N , and rm i is the j -th investor, then rm i 's payoff is the following:
where r denotes the common discount rate, and T N C1 C1. We introduce the following assumptions: Investing always increases period payoffs for a rm, but the bene ts of investing decrease in the total number of investors: as more rms invest, competition among the investors becomes more intense.
A 2. The current value cost function c.t/e rt is (i) strictly decreasing and (ii) strictly convex.
The cost of investing declines over time. This may capture upstream process innovations or economies of learning and scale. Moreover, cost declines at a decreasing rate. Assumption 3(i) guarantees that investing at time zero is too costly. No rm would invest immediately, even if it could thereby preempt all other rms and enjoy monopoly pro ts .1/ forever. Assumption 3(ii) ensures that the value of investing becomes positive in nite time: The cost of investing eventually reaches a level suf ciently low, that it becomes pro table to invest, even for a rm facing maximum competition. 5 In what follows, we will denote by t j the j -th equilibrium investment time. 6 If the j -th and .j C 1/-th investments occur at the same instant in time, i.e. t j D t j C1 , we say that they are clustered.
Strategies in Continuous-Time Preemption Games
We model strategies in a timing game with observable actions and continuous time adopting the framework introduced by Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) . 7 Each player has two actions available, "wait" and "invest." Players can move at any time in OE0; 1/. A decision node is a point in time paired with a complete description of past moves, and a pure strategy is de ned as a function that assigns an action to each node. An outcome is a complete record of the decisions made throughout the game.
In this framework, the question of how to associate an outcome to a continuoustime strategy pro le is addressed in the following way. A continuous-time strategy here is interpreted as "a set of instructions about how to play the game on every conceivable discrete-time grid"(Simon and Stinchcombe (1989), p. 1174). For any continuoustime strategy pro le, a sequence of outcomes is generated by restricting play to an arbitrary sequence of increasingly ne discrete-time grids, and the limit of this sequence of outcomes is de ned as the continuous-time outcome of the pro le. Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) identify conditions for the existence and the uniqueness of this limit. The strategies we consider here will satisfy these conditions. 8 The Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) framework is de ned for pure strategies only.
9
A well-known problem with modeling preemption games in continuous time is that typically games in this class do not have an equilibrium in pure strategies, due to the possibility of coordination failures. We explicitly rule out coordination failures introducing a randomization device as in Katz and Shapiro (1987) , Dutta, Lach and Rustichini (1995) , and Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2005). 5 . We will discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption in Section 3.3.
6. In Proposition 1 we prove that the vector of equilibrium investment times .t 1 ; : : : ; t N / is unique.
7. Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2005) rst showed how to adopt this framework to model a preemption game.
8. The conditions required are (F1) an upper bound on the number of moves, (F2) that strategies depend piecewise continuously on time, and (F3) strong right continuity of the strategies with respect to histories. Condition (F1) is naturally satis ed, because investment is a one-time irreversible decision. Condition (F2) is an explicit restriction that we impose on the strategies. We satisfy condition (F3) by considering strategies which depend only on how many rms have already invested but not on the time when they have invested.
9. For N D 2 our model is a special case of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) . They develop an alternative methodology for modeling games in continuous time, based on an extended de nition of mixed strategies. When applied to the two player case, their methodology generates the same equilibrium outcome. We conjecture that this would be true also for the general N -player case.
A
4. If n rms invest at the same instant t (with n D 2; 3; : : : ; N ), then only one rm, each with probability 1=n succeeds.
The randomization device is introduced for the purpose of ruling out the possibility that simultaneous investments occur as a consequence of a coordination failure. At the same time, it allows for the presence of simultaneous investments as long as they are optimal for the rms involved.
To illustrate how the randomization device works, consider the case N D 2. First, suppose that at a given time t each rm would like to invest, provided that the rival does not do so. Suppose that at time t both rms try to invest. Without the randomization device, they would both be successful, i.e. they would both pay the cost c.t/ and start receiving ow payoffs .2/. This would constitute a coordination failure: ex-post, each rm would regret having invested. With the randomization device instead, if at time t both rms try to invest, "the clock stops". The game proceeds as follows with time standing still. First, only one of the two rms (each with probability 1=2) successfully invests, i.e. only one actually pays the cost c.t/. Then, the remaining rm observes that its opponent has invested. It has two options. It can try to invest "consecutively but at the same instant of time,"
10 that is after observing the rst investment, but at the same time t. Alternatively it can let the clock restart and the game continue. Since the rm observes that its opponent has invested at t, and investment at t was optimal only provided that the rival did not invest, it selects the second option. Hence, at t only one rm invests and there is no coordination failure. Now suppose that at time t each rm nds it optimal to invest whether or not the rival does so. If both rms try invest at t, the clock stops. Only one rm is successful. The remaining rm has again the option to invest or let the clock restart. Now, however it will choose to invest immediately because it is optimal to do so. Hence there will be a cluster of two investments, which does not constitute a coordination failure. 11, 12 2.3. The Optimal "Stand-Alone" Nnvestment Times
In this subsection we illustrate the basic trade-off of the investment problem, abstracting from strategic considerations. Consider the hypothetical problem of a rm who acts as a single decision maker and has to select the optimal time to make an investment which has cost c.t/ and guarantees ow payoff of .j / forever, for j 2 ¹1; : : : ; N º, where c.t/ and .j / satisfy assumptions 1 to 3. This rm would 10 . See Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) , p. 1177.
11. For an interpretation of this randomization device, we refer to Dutta, Lach and Rustichini (1995) . An alternative assumption is made in Dutta and Rustichini (1993) : If two rms stop simultaneously, both receive a convex combination of the payoff from being the only one to stop at that time, and the payoff from stopping later, at the optimal time for a "follower". This assumption introduces the possibility of clusters of simultaneous investments through a mechanism that is unrelated to the one illustrated in our paper.
12. An alternative formalization of continuous time strategies has been introduced recently by Murto and Välimäki (2011) . To be applied in this model, it also needs to be augmented with a randomization device to avoid non-existence of equilibrium. choose t to maximize the following pro t:
We denote the solution to this problem as T j . Adopting the terminology in Katz and Shapiro (1987), we de ne it as the stand-alone investment time for .j /. Observe that f j .t/ is strictly quasi-concave and that T j is well-de ned 13 for every j 2 1; : : : ; N as the solution to f
At time T j , the marginal bene t from delaying investment, that is the cost reduction c 0 .t/, is exactly equal to the marginal cost, that is the foregone discounted pro t ow .j / e rt . Before T j , a player is willing to delay because the cost is decreasing at a speed that more than compensates the foregone pro t ow. After T j , a player would rather invest immediately than delay. It follows from the implicit function theorem that T j < T j 0 for j < j 0 : For a larger foregone pro t ow, that is for j < j 0 , the stand-alone time is earlier.
Equilibrium Analysis
We now return to the strategic environment, and solve for the equilibria of the game. A feature of any equilibrium of the game that is built into our assumptions is the following: Assumptions 1(ii) and 3(i) guarantee that investment at time zero is too costly. 14 Assumptions 2(i) and 3(ii) guarantee that all rms invest in nite time. The result that the last equilibrium investment time is exactly the stand-alone investment time T N is not surprising: when only one active rm is left, it maximizes the pro t .2/ for j D N .
Next, we introduce our benchmark: the two-player investment game analyzed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) .
The Benchmark Case: Two Firms, no Clustering
Suppose N D 2. The easiest way to capture the intuition for this game is to use a backward induction approach. By Lemma 1, both rms invest no later than the second 13 . For a proof, see Claim A.1 in the Appendix.
14. This fact is crucial in proving that all players receive the same payoff in equilibrium. Relaxing assumption 3(i), one could generate an equilibrium in which some players invest at time zero and receive a higher payoff than the remaining players, who would instead invest later and receive all the same, lower payoff.
stand-alone investment time T 2 . Therefore, each rm anticipates that if it invests rst at some time t < T 2 , the opponent will follow at T 2 . The payoff from this early investment will then be what Fudenberg and Tirole de ne as the Leader Payoff,
Alternatively, a rm could wait until T 2 and receive the Follower Payoff,
The bene t from being the leader, rather than the follower, is that high pro ts .1/ are earned for some period. The cost is that early investment is more expensive than late investment. The fact that the cost of investment, although initially prohibitive, is decreasing and convex, guarantees that the leader and follower payoff curves have the shape illustrated in Figure 1 . Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) prove that the rst time at which an investment occurs in equilibrium, t 1 , is the earliest time when the two curves intersect. In equilibrium, rms invest at different points in time 15 and payoffs are the same for both rms (there is rent equalization). The mechanism at work is the following: if unconstrained by strategic considerations, a single rm would like to invest at the stand-alone time T
1 . Also in the presence of an opponent, each rm would like to invest rst, at T 1 . The opponent would then follow at T 2 . The leader would receive a higher payoff than the follower. This cannot be an equilibrium because the rm who takes the role of the follower could pro tably deviate and preempt the opponent by investing at T 1 ". The presence of a second player introduces a Leader Preemption Constraint (LPC) on the time of the rst investment: Leader investment cannot take place at a time when earlier preemption is pro table. As a consequence, the rst investment must occur strictly earlier than T 1 . In particular, it must occur weakly before the rst intersection of the Leader and Follower payoff functions. Since the leader payoff function is increasing in that interval, the rst investment will occur at the latest time that satis es the LPC, i.e. the rst intersection of the two curves.
The Three-Firm Game: When are the First Two Investments Clustered?
In this section, we move away from the two-player benchmark and illustrate the possibility of clustering in a the context of a three-player game. As in the two-player game, the rst investment must occur strictly earlier than T 1 . The key difference from the two-player game is that t 1 is identi ed by the presence of two constraints. One is the LPC constraint discussed above. The second is what we call the Follower Preemption Constraint (FPC). The latter re ects the fact that the rst investment is followed by a preemption race among the remaining two players. This race among followers determines an upper bound on the time of the rst investment.
The aim of this section is twofold. First, we show that the rst and second investments can be clustered or not clustered. Which case occurs depends on which of the two constraints on t 1 , the FPC or the LPC, is binding in equilibrium. Then, we examine how the model primitives determine which constraint is binding. We proceed by solving the game by backward induction. Figure 2 illustrates.
The Two-Firm Subgame. Suppose that the rst investment has occurred, and consider the ensuing two-rm subgame. It is analogous to the two-rm game of Section 3.1. By Lemma 1, all rms must invest by T 3 . Each rm anticipates that if it invests rst at some time t < T 3 , the opponent will follow at T 3 . The Leader Payoff and Follower Payoff for this subgame are
e rs ds c.t/ and (6)
respectively. The threat of preemption guarantees that the rst investment in the subgame must take place at the earliest time when L 2 .t/ D F 2 .t/. The second investment time in the game, t 2 , coincides with this intersection. The last investment occurs at T 3 .
The Follower Preemption Constraint (FPC).
The conclusion above that the second investment occurs at the earliest intersection of L 2 .t/ and F 2 .t/ clearly assumes that the rst investment must occur weakly before this intersection. We show by contradiction that this must be the case in equilibrium. Suppose that the rst investment took place strictly later, at some time T 3 . A two-rm subgame would then start at . Because L 2 . / > F 2 . /, both rms would prefer to be leader rather than follower in this subgame. They would both try to invest at , one would succeed and the other would invest later at T 3 . This cannot be an equilibrium because each of the last two investors receives a lottery between L 2 . / and F 2 . / while it could deviate and guarantee itself a payoff arbitrarily close to L 2 . /. Deviating by investing at ", a rm would be the rst investor in the game. It would trigger a two-rm subgame in which one more investment would occur at " and the last one at T 3 . Therefore, the deviator would receive a payoff of L 2 . "/.
We have established that the time of the rst investment t 1 is constrained by the presence of a preemption race in the ensuing two-rm subgame: to guarantee that there is rent equalization in this race, t 1 must be no later than the rst intersection of the leader and follower payoff curves of the two-rm subgame, namely L 2 .t/ and F 2 .t/. We call this the Follower Preemption Constraint (FPC). As the second investment time t 2 coincides with this intersection, we say that the FPC is binding in equilibrium if the rst investment occurs exactly at t 2 , and not binding if it occurs strictly earlier than t 2 .
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The Leader Preemption Constraint (LPC). We now illustrate the LPC for the threeplayer game. It follows from the analysis above that the second and third investments will occur at t 2 , with L 2 .t 2 / D F 2 .t 2 /, and t 3 D T 3 respectively. The FPC requires that the rst investment occurs weakly earlier than the rst intersection of L 2 .t/ and F 2 .t/. Therefore, the Leader payoff in the three-player game, i.e. the payoff of the rst investor, is,
The Follower payoff in the three-rm game, i.e. the payoff from being either the second or the third investor, is
e rs ds c.T
The Relationship Between FPC and LPC. The FPC re ects the intensity of the follower preemption race that starts after the rst investment: The more intense this race, the earlier is the rst intersection of L 2 .t/ and F 2 .t/, i.e. the earlier is t 2 . The LPC instead re ects the intensity of the race to be the rst investor. These two constraints are not independent: The intensity of the race to be the rst investor is a direct consequence of the intensity of the follower preemption race between the second and the third investors. Hence, the LPC is directly affected by the FPC. To capture this relationship between the two constraints, notice that the more intense the follower preemption race is, the earlier t 2 is, hence the tighter the constraint on t 1 imposed by the FPC becomes. At the same time, the earlier t 2 is, the shorter the period for which the rst investor earns monopoly pro ts becomes: Early t 2 makes the role of the rst investor less desirable. Therefore, the more intense the follower preemption race is, the less intense is the race to be the rst investor: the stronger the FPC, the weaker the LPC.
The key observation of our analysis is that for any given set of parameters, only one of the two constraints is binding, and which constraint is binding is equivalent to whether the rst two investments are clustered or not. If the follower preemption race is suf ciently intense, only the FPC is binding, and investments are clustered. Otherwise, only the LPC is binding, and investment times are different. We discuss these two cases below, and illustrate them in Figure 2 .
First, observe that the leader payoff L 1 .t/ is strictly quasiconcave, and maximized at T 1 . The intuition for this is that T 1 , being determined by .1/, re ects the desirability of the role of the rst investor, hence the strength of the LPC, while t 2 re ects the strength of the FPC.
Clustering vs. No Clustering. In all three panels, the third investment occurs at T 3 and the second at the rst intersection of L 2 .t/and F 2 .t/ . Duopoly pro ts decrease from panel 2(a) to 2(c), delaying the second investment time t 2 . In panels 2(a) and 2(b), t 2 T 1 , so in the race to be rst, F 1 .t/ exceeds L 1 .t/ before t 2 . Hence, only the FPC is binding and investments are clustered. Panel 2(b) represents the cut-off case with t 2 D T 1 . In 2(c), (Figures 2(a) and 2(b) ). The LPC is not binding, because the follower payoff F 1 .t/ exceeds the leader payoff L 1 .t/ at any t < t 2 . The rst investment occurs exactly at t 2 : the FPC is binding. The payoffs of all players are equalized. The rst two investment times are clustered:
Case ii. t 2 > T 1 (Figure 2(c) ). The LPC is binding: The leader payoff L 1 .t/ exceeds the follower payoff F 1 .t/ to the left of t 2 . The preemption race to be the rst investor brings t 1 forward to the earliest intersection of leader and follower payoffs. The payoffs of all players are equalized. The FPC instead, is not binding. The rst two investments are not clustered:
How Model Primitives Determine the Presence of a Cluster. As can be seen in Figure 2 , whether case (i) or case (ii) will occur is equivalent to whether L 2 .t/ F 2 .t/, the incentive to preempt in the 2-player subgame that follows the rst investment, is positive or negative when evaluated at T 
The previous observation allows us to identify the parameter range for which case (i) and case (ii) occur, respectively. Evaluating the preemption incentive
Recalling that T 1 is a decreasing function of .1/ and T 3 is a decreasing function of .3/, we observe that the preemption incentive evaluated at T 1 is a function of the three pro t parameters .1/, .2/, .3/. For pro t structures such that the preemption incentive .10/ is nonnegative, the rst two investments are clustered, for all other pro t structures, clustering does not occur.
The preemption incentive .10/ is monotone in each of the pro t parameters .1/, .2/ and .3/. The intuition is captured by looking at how each of them affects the relative strength of the two constraints. First, the preemption incentive (10/ is decreasing in .1/. Hence, starting from the cut-off case, increasing .1/ we fall into case (ii) (no clustering). The intuition is that an increase in .1/ makes the role of leader of the three-player preemption race more attractive. Hence, the LPC becomes binding.
Next, consider .2/ and .3/. The preemption incentive .10/ is increasing in .2/ and decreasing in .3/. Hence, starting from the cut-off case, increasing .2/ or decreasing .3/ there continues to be a cluster. The intuition is that an increase in .2/ or a decrease in .3/ makes the role of the second investor more attractive relative to the role of third investor. The preemption race among the followers becomes more intense, and this brings t 2 forward. The FPC constraint becomes stronger. At the same time, earlier t 2 makes the role of the rst investor less attractive so the LPC becomes weaker.
In Section 3.4, we will show that the intuition above can be translated into a suf cient condition for the presence of a cluster: given any pair ..1/; .3//, if .2/ is suf ciently close to .1/, then the rst and second investments are clustered.
The General Case: N Firms
In this section, we formalize and generalize our characterization of the equilibrium outcome of the game with three players to the general case of N players.
After the rst j 1 investments have taken place, two constraints determine the next investment time t j . First, the LPC: preempting the leader of the current subgame, i.e. the j -th investor, by investing earlier than t j , must not be pro table. Second, the FPC: t j must be weakly earlier than the time of the next investment, t j C1 , which is determined by the preemption race in the subgame played by the followers after the j -th investment. 17 Proposition 1 below establishes that the equilibrium outcome of the game is unique, that the rent equalization result is preserved even for a general number of players, and allows us to construct a simple recursive algorithm to compute the equilibrium investment times and determine the presence of clusters. In equilibrium, all players earn a payoff equal to the last investor's: .1=r/.N /e rT N c.T N /. The Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) rent-equalization result extends to the N -player game because we assume that pre-investment payoffs are constant. This in turn implies that in each preemption race the Follower payoff is independent of the exact time of earlier investments. While the game admits a unique equilibrium outcome in terms of investment times and equilibrium payoffs, the role taken by each investor in the investment sequence is not uniquely identi ed. 18 Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 suggest the following simple recursive algorithm to compute the equilibrium investment times .t 1 ; t 2 : : : ; t N / and determine the presence of clusters:
1. The last investment time is equal to the last stand-alone investment time:
, and t j solves the rent equalization condition
where L j .t/ and F j .t/ are de ned analogously to L 1 .t/ and F 1 .t/.
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Case (ii) is analogous to Case (i) in Section 3.2: the FPC alone is binding. Case (ii) is analogous to Case (ii) in Section 3.2: the LPC alone is binding.
Proposition 1 has two implications that go beyond the features of the threeplayer example. First, for N > 3 clusters can include more than two simultaneous investments: suppose that the preemption race for the role of .j C 1/-th investor is suf ciently intense that not only t j C1 < T j , but t j C1 < T j 1 < T j : in this case, the .j 1/-th, j -th and .j C 1/-th investments will be clustered. In Section 3.4 we illustrate how model primitives affect the size of a cluster.
Second, clusters can occur not only at the beginning, but at any point of the investment sequence, except for the last. 20 
The Condition for a Cluster
In Section 3.2 we have illustrated the mechanism that leads to clustered investments in the special case of N D 3: We introduced the LPC and the FPC and provided 18 . In a symmetric equilibrium all rms that have not invested yet try to invest at every equilibrium investment time. The realized order of investments is determined by the randomization device. In an asymmetric equilibrium the order of investments can be pre-determined or partially random. For instance, the randomization device can be used to determine only the rst investor. Firms could then coordinate on the identity of later investors based on this outcome. We thank a referee for pointing this out.
19. For a formal de nition, see proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
20. If investment is not pro table for all players, so that entry is effectively endogenous, then a cluster can also occur at the end of the investment sequence. Suppose we relax Assumption 3(ii) so that only M < N can pro tably invest. After the .M 1/-th investment, there is a race among the remaining active players to secure the last pro table investment possibility. By rent equalization, the last investor (as well as all the predecessors) must earn the same equilibrium payoff as the .N M / players who do not invest, which is zero. The last investment is thus brought forward to a time t M earlier than the stand-alone time T M . If t M < T M 1 ; then there is cluster at t M 1 D t M . In the baseline model instead, the last investment time t N is T N , therefore it is always strictly later than T N 1 .
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an intuitive discussion of how the model parameters affect these two constraints and determine the presence or absence of a cluster. In this section, we formally investigate how the mechanism illustrated in Section 3.2 relates to the model primitives. More precisely, we ask under which condition on the parameters of the model two or more subsequent investments, at any point in the investment sequence, are clustered.
The answer is that they are clustered if the associated ow pro ts are suf ciently close. To obtain this result, we rst argue that whether two subsequent investments are clustered or not depends only on a subvector of the pro t structure . Second, we present a comparative statics result relating investment times and ow pro ts. Third, we identify a suf cient condition on the pro t structure for a cluster of two or more investments. Figure 3 illustrates the analysis.
We start by observing that the equilibrium characterization in Proposition 1 implies the following:
The condition for a cluster of two subsequent investments is independent of the ow-pro t parameters associated with earlier investments.
Proposition 1 states that whether the j -th and .j C 1/-th investments are clustered is determined by the comparison of the stand-alone investment time T j and the .j C 1/-th equilibrium investment time t j C1 . Hence, the condition for a cluster depends only on the ow-pro t parameters affecting T j and t j C1 . As illustrated in Section 2.3, T j depends only on the ow-pro t parameter .j /. To see which pro t parameters determine t j C1 , consider the algorithm identifying the equilibrium investment times. The last investment occurs at t N D T N , hence it depends only on one ow-pro t parameter, .N /. The previous investment time, t N 1 , depends on .N 1/ and on the ow-pro t parameters that affect t N ; that is on .N /. Continuing to apply the algorithm, it follows that t j C1 depends only on .j C 1/ and on the ow pro t parameters that affect later investments, that is on the vector ..j C 1/; .j C 2/; : : : ; .N //.
We now present a comparative statics result that will play a key role in the construction of the suf cient condition for a cluster.
P 2. Each equilibrium investment time is decreasing in the associated flow profit.
For expositional purposes consider a pro t structure such that the equilibrium investment times t j and t j C1 are different. An increase in .j / makes the role of the j -th investor more pro table. Rent equalization requires that the j -th investor receives the same equilibrium payoff as the .j C 1/-th investor. The latter is unaffected by the increase in .j /. Hence, in equilibrium an increase in .j / has to be offset by an increase in the investment cost. This implies bringing t j forward, because the investment cost is decreasing in time.
The monotonicity of equilibrium investment times in ow pro ts leads to our main result. An increase in .j / brings t j forward. For suf ciently large .j /, that is for .j / suf ciently close to .j 1/, t j occurs at a time earlier than T j 1 : This results in a cluster of the j -th and .j 1/-th investment. By the same mechanism, if .j / is suf ciently close to .j 2/, the investment time t j is brought forward to a time even earlier than T j 2 . This results in a cluster of three investments: t j 2 D t j 1 D t j . Figure 3 illustrates this mechanism. More generally, for any j 2 ¹2; ::; N 1º and k 2 ¹1; ::; j 1º, the suf cient condition for a cluster of two or more investments is as follows:
If .j / is sufficiently close to .j k/, then the j -th investment is clustered with the previous k investments.
To capture the intuition for this result, consider the simplest case of a cluster of two investments. Suppose that the parameter values are such that the j -th investment is not clustered with the previous one. Consider an increase in the ow pro ts .j /. How does it affect the preemption incentives in the game? The same reasoning illustrated in Section 3.2 and Figure 2 for N D 3 and j D 2 applies here. The .j 1/-th investment time is determined by the Follower and Leader Preemption Constraints (FPC and LPC). Everything else equal, an increase in .j / makes the role of the j -th investor more attractive. Therefore, the follower preemption race in the subgame starting after the .j 1/-th investment becomes more intense. This brings forward the investment time t j , which constitutes the upper bound on the investment time t j 1 stemming from the FPC. In turn, an earlier investment time t j makes the role of the .j 1/-th investor less attractive, so the preemption race for the role of the .j 1/-th investor is less intense, and the LPC becomes weaker. The natural question is whether one can increase .j / to such an extent that the FPC becomes binding and the LPC not binding. Proposition 3 provides a positive answer: for any value of the remaining primitives of the model, one can always nd a .j / strictly smaller than .j 1/ but suf ciently close to it, such that the FPC is binding, the LPC is not, and the j -th investment is clustered with the previous one.
We conclude with a remark regarding what can be learned about pro ts, when data on the timing of investments are observed. Our result says that clustering of entry or adoption times does not imply that payoffs are not declining in rival investment. If investment times are generated by a preemption game and clustering is observed, this implies a bound on the decline in pro ts due to rival investment. In the case where only time aggregated information is available, for instance in the form of annual data, bounds could nevertheless be obtained but would be less informative the higher the level of temporal aggregation.
Consider the case N D 3 and x the investment cost function and the interest rate. Then one can nd .3/ as it is the unique solution to the stand-alone problem in (2) given 
Conclusions
This paper analyzed an N -player preemption game in which players' payoff before investing are constant (and normalized to zero). The game has a unique equilibrium outcome, and the rent equalization result of the two-player game analyzed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) is preserved. We nd that clusters of simultaneous investments are possible. When the preemption race among late investors is very intense, the preemption incentive for earlier investors is reduced. If this effect is suf ciently strong, two or more investments occur at the same time. We characterize a suf cient condition on the model primitives for two or more investments to be clustered: The ow pro ts of subsequent investments must be suf ciently close. Our results imply that the observation of investment clustering in preemptive environments need not re ect informational spillovers, positive externalities, or coordination failures. Instead, clustering implies a bound on the decline in pro ts due to rival investment. 
Appendix
(c) f j T j > 0 and T j < T j 0 for j < j 0 .
Proof. Part (a).
We prove that the function is strictly quasiconcave, by showing that in every critical point of the function the second derivative is strictly negative. Part (b). We prove that the rst order condition f 0 j .t/ D 0 admits a solution and hence characterizes the unique global maximum of the function by showing that f 0 j .t/ is positive at zero and negative for suf ciently large values of t. Assumptions 1 and 3 guarantee that f j .t/ is negative at zero and positive at a later time. Quasiconcavity then implies that f 0 j .0/ > 0. Moreover, since f j .t/ is continuous and either always increasing or single peaked, it admits a limit as t goes to in nity. This limit must be greater than or equal to zero by Assumption 3(ii). It must also be smaller than or equal to zero because lim t!C1 f j .t/ D lim t!C1 c.t/. Hence, the only possible candidate limit is zero. But if that is the case, since the function is positive from some onwards, as t goes to in nity it must approach zero from above. Hence it must be decreasing for suf ciently large. We therefore conclude that the function f j .t/ admits a critical point.
Part (c). Assumptions 2(i) and 3(ii) imply that f N .t/ is strictly positive for any t T N . Thus, Assumption 1(ii) implies that f j .T j / > 0 for all j . Finally, note that by the implicit function theorem
where the inequality holds because T j is a maximum, hence the denominator is negative. Therefore, Assumption 1(ii) implies that T Proof of Lemma 1. Assumptions 1(ii) and 3(i) guarantee that there is no investment at time zero: the cost of investing immediately is higher than the maximum amount of pro ts a rm can obtain in this game.
The proof of the result that all rms invest in nite time, and the last investment takes place at the stand-alone investment time T N is split into two parts. First, we show that in equilibrium, at any decision node with one active rm and calendar time t, the rm plays "wait" if t < T N and "invest" otherwise. Then, we show that in any decision node with t T N any number of active rms play "invest". The payoff of a single active rm from investing at time t is f N .t/, de ned in equation .2/. From Claim A.1, f N .t/ has a strict global maximum in T N and its maximum value is strictly positive. Therefore, a single active rm will optimally play "wait" if t < T N and "invest" otherwise. Next, consider decision nodes with t T N and two active rms. We show that both rms must invest exactly at t.
First, suppose that at t they both play "invest". By assumption 4 only one of them succeeds and the game enters a subgame with one active rm. As we proved above, this rm invests immediately, so both rms invest at time t and receive payoff f N .t/. No rm has an incentive to deviate from these strategies. With two active rms, deviating and playing "wait" would not change the outcome, nor the deviator's payoff. The nondeviating rm would invest immediately. The game would therefore enter a subgame with one active rm in which the deviator would optimally invest immediately, as we proved above.
Next, suppose that at time t only one of the two active rms plays "invest". The outcome is again that both rms invest at t, because after one rm invests the game enters a subgame with one active rm in which it is optimal to invest immediately. No rm has an incentive to deviate from these strategies. The rm who plays "wait" has no incentive to deviate because the outcome, hence its payoff, would be unchanged. Now suppose that the rm who plays "invest" deviates. It would get either a payoff of zero, if it never invests, or f N . / if it invests at some > t. Since f N ./ is positive and strictly decreasing in the interval considered, the deviation is not pro table.
Finally, suppose that at time t both rms play "wait". The argument immediately above shows that each rm would be better off by deviating and playing "invest" at t.
Repeating the same argument for`D 3; : : : ; N , it follows that in any SPNE, at any decision node with t T N and any number`of active rms, at least one of them plays "invest", and the claim follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 1. Through a series of Lemmata we show that the game admits a unique SPNE outcome, and characterize its properties. The proof is articulated in the following steps.
Denote by t j the SPNE investment time of the j -th investor, for j 2 ¹1; : : : ; N º: In De nition A.1, we introduce three functions, L j .t/, F j .t/, and their difference D j .t/. In Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2 we characterize their properties. Over a wellde ned subset of their domain, L j .t/ and F j .t/ can be interpreted as the payoff of the j -th investor and the .j C 1/-th investor, respectively, if the j -th investment takes place at t and the following investments take place at t j C1 ,…, t N respectively. In the de nition, the existence and uniqueness of the SPNE investment times is assumed. In the development of the proof, they will be proved. The existence and uniqueness of t N D T N was proved in Lemma 1. In Lemma A.3 we establish that in any subgame with one active rm, it plays "wait" before T N and "invest" from T N on. In Lemma A.4, we prove that there exists a time T N 1 < T N in which L N 1 .T N 1 / D F N 1 .T N 1 / and in Lemma A.5 we prove that this is the unique .N 1/-th equilibrium investment time. Therefore, the equilibrium payoff of the last two investors is the same.
Finally, in Lemmata A.6, A.7 and A.8 we identify the algorithm for the construction of the equilibrium investment times t j for j 2 ¹1; : : : ; N 2º, identifying the condition for clustering, and prove that rent equalization holds in equilibrium for all players. The argument is based on the induction principle. Lemma A.6 proves that there exists an algorithm to identify the unique t N 2 ; given t N 1 and t N , and that the equilibrium payoff of the last three investors is the same. Lemma A.7 shows that if an analogous algorithm can be used to identify a unique value of t N l , given t N lC1 ,…,t N , and rent equalization holds for the last l players, then the same algorithm identi es a unique value for t N l 1 ; given t N l ,…,t N , and rent equalization holds for the last l C 1 players. Lemma A.8 applies the induction principle to prove that the algorithm can be used to construct the SPNE investment times t 1 ,…, t N 2 and rent equalization holds for all players. 
Notice that F j .t/ is constant with respect to t. 
Proof. Since D j .t/ and f j .t/ differ by a nite constant, Claim A.1 implies that D j .t/ is strictly quasi-concave. Also, D j .0/ < 0; since
Here the second inequality holds by assumption 3(i) and the third because no rm gets a negative payoff in equilibrium as it could always delay investment inde nitely ensuring a payoff of zero. Moreover, D j .t j C1 / D 0. Therefore, two cases are possible:
In the next Lemma, we analyze decision nodes with one active rm. 
Proof. Part (i).
We start from the observation that if t belongs to the interval
The proof now consists of three steps:
Step (a) identi es two strategy pro les that generate the same outcome and constitute an equilibrium for any subgame with n > 1 active rms starting at t 2 T N 1 ; T N .
Step (b) rules out any other candidate equilibrium for subgames with n > 1 active rms starting at t 2 T N 1 ; T N :
Step (c) considers subgames with n > 1 active rms starting exactly at t D T N 1 :
.a/ We rst show that it is an equilibrium for any subgame with n > 1 active rms starting at t 2 T N 1 ; T N that each active rm plays "invest" at all times t, unless it is the only active rm. 21 The outcome of this candidate equilibrium is that all active rms try to invest immediately at t, until only one is left. The last active rm will then wait to invest until time T N by Lemma A.3. The associated payoff for each rm is a lottery between L N 1 .t/ and F N 1 .t/ with probability 1=n assigned to F N 1 .t/.
Suppose one rm deviates and plays "wait" at t although it is not the only active rm. We show that any deviation involving the play of "wait" at t when one or more other rms are active gives a smaller payoff than the payoff in the candidate equilibrium. We need to distinguish three possible classes of deviations according to the speci c circumstances when the deviator plays "wait".
First, consider the class of deviations in which the rm plays "wait" at t if at least one other rm is active. At t, the n 1 non-deviating rms follow the given strategies, hence n 1 investments occur at t and the deviating rm becomes the last active one. By Claim A.1, the most pro table deviation in this class is the one in which the deviator later invests at T N . The associated payoff is F N 1 .t/ which is smaller than the lottery between L N 1 .t/ and F N 1 .t/ given by the candidate equilibrium.
Second, consider the class of deviations in which the rm plays "wait" at t if the number of active rms is different from n l, for a given l such that n l > 1. At t, 21 . The proof that the above pro le is an equilibrium also proves that the following strategy pro le, which generates the same outcome, is an equilibrium: In all subgames with n > 1 active firms starting at t 2 T N 1 ; T N each active firm plays "wait" at t and "invest" at all times > t , unless it is the only active one.
the n 1 non-deviating rms follow the given strategies. The deviation outcome is the following. First, the n 1 non-deviating rms will play "invest" until l investments will occur. Then, when there are n l active rms left, all of them, including the deviator, will play "invest". With probability 1=.n l/, the deviating rm will successfully invest and receive payoff L N 1 .t/. With the complementary probability, the deviating rm will fail to invest. In the latter case, the game enters a subgame with n l 1 active rms in which all rms except for the deviator will continue to play "invest" at t, until the deviator is the only active rm. By Claim A.1, we can again identify the most pro table deviation within this class: If the outcome of the randomization device is such that the deviator is unsuccessful in investing when there are n l active rms, the deviator will be the last active rm remaining. In this case, it should then invest at T N . Hence, the highest payoff in this class of deviations is a lottery between L N 1 .t/ and F N 1 .t/, with probability .n l 1/=.n l/ assigned to F N 1 .t/, which is worse than the lottery deriving from the candidate equilibrium strategies because .n l 1/=.n l/ > 1=n.
Third, an analogous argument shows that the class of deviations in which the rm plays "wait" at t if the number of active rms is different from n l, for a set of at least two integers l; such that n l > 1 for every l, the highest possible payoff is a lottery between L N 1 .t/ and F N 1 .t/, which assigns to F N 1 .t/ a higher probability than the lottery deriving from the candidate equilibrium strategies.
.b/ Next, we show that if t belongs to the interval T N 1 ; T N , no strategy pro le different from the ones presented in .a/ constitutes an equilibrium. We need to rule out two classes of strategy pro les: one in which at t, with n active rms, one or more rm plays "wait" and one or more rms play "invest", and one in which all active rms play "wait" in an interval with positive measure starting at t.
We develop the argument by induction. First we show it holds for n D 2 active rms. Then we show that if it holds for n D m 2; then it holds for n D m C 1. Finally, we conclude that it holds for any n 2 by the induction principle.
The statement holds for n D 2: We consider two classes of strategy pro les: one in which at t, with two active rms, one rm plays "wait" and the other plays "invest", and one in which both active rms play "wait" in an interval with positive measure starting at t.
No strategy pro le in the rst class can be an equilibrium, because the rm who plays "wait" ends up being the last active rm in the game, thus receiving a payoff no larger than F N 1 .t/, while it could pro tably deviate by playing "invest" and receiving a lottery between L N 1 .t/ and F N 1 .t/.
Strategy pro les in the second class imply that the rst investment in the subgame occurs strictly later than t and weakly before T N (by Lemma 1), at some 2 t; T N , and the second at T N by Lemma A.3. The strategy pro les for which both rms play "invest" at cannot be an equilibrium because both rms get .1=2/ OEL N 1 . / C F N 1 . / while each of them could deviate by investing at " and receiving L N 1 . "/. By continuity, 9" > 0 small enough that this is pro table. The strategies pro les for which only one of the two rms plays "invest" at cannot be an equilibrium. The rm who does not invest at must invest at T N by Lemma A.3, thus receiving F N 1 . /. It could pro tably deviate by investing at " and getting
If the statement holds for m, it holds for m C 1. Again, we need to consider two classes of strategy pro les: one in which at time t, with m C 1 active rms, only < m C 1 play "invest", with > 0, and one in which all active rms play "wait" in an interval with positive measure starting at t.
No strategy pro le in the rst class can be an equilibrium. At t, one of the rms will succesfully invest and the game will enter a subgame with m active rms and calendar time t. Given the assumption that the statement holds for n D m, in such a subgame all m active rms invest immediately until only one is left, which invests at T N . Hence, each of them receives payoff L N 1 .t/ with probability .m 1/=m and payoff F N 1 .t/ with probability 1=m. This implies that any of the m C 1 rms who play "wait" at t when there are still m C 1 active rms receives expected payoff .1=m/ OE.m 1/L N 1 .t/ C F N 1 .t/ : It could pro tably deviate by playing "invest" at t with m C 1 active rms. This deviation is pro table because it increases the probability of receiving L N 1 .t/ and decreases the probability of receiving F N 1 .t/.
Strategy pro les in the second class imply that the rst investment in the subgame occurs strictly later than t and weakly before T N (by Lemma 1), at some 2 t; T N . Consider any such pro le and denote by D 1; : : : ; m C 1 the number of rms who play "invest" at time if there are m C 1 active rms. At , one succesful investment occurs and the game enters a subgame with m active rms. Given the assumption that the statement holds for n D m, at all the m remaining active rms invest immediately until only one is left, who invests at T N . For < m C 1, there is at least one rm who initally plays "wait" at . This rm receives .1=m/ OE.m 1/ L N 1 . / C F N 1 . /. It could pro tably deviate by investing at " and receiving L N 1 . "/ which is a larger payoff, for " small enough. If instead D m C 1, all rms receive payoff 1=.m C 1/ OEmL N 1 . / C F N 1 . /. Each of them could pro tably deviate by preempting the opponents and investing at ". This would yield payoff L N 1 . "/ which is larger than the above, for " small enough.
This completes the induction argument and we can conclude that if t belongs to the interval T N 1 ; T N , no strategy pro le different from the ones presented in .a/ constitutes an equilibrium.
.c/ We conclude by considering subgames with n > 1 active rms, starting at
This implies that the proof in step .a/ also holds for subgames starting at t D T N 1 . Hence the pro les analyzed in .a/ also constitute an equilibrium for the subgames with n > 1 active rms, starting at t D T N 1 . Now consider step .b/ : It shows that for for t 2 T N 1 ; T N strategy pro les in two classes cannot be an equilibrium: pro les in which at t, with n active rms, one or more rm plays "wait" and one or more rms play "invest", and pro les in which all active rms play "wait" in an interval with positive measure starting at t. For subgames starting at t D T N 1 instead, while it is true that pro les in the second class cannot be an equilibrium, strategy pro les in the rst class are an equilibrium. The outcome of such a pro le is that n 1 investments occur at T N 1 and one occurs at T 
where the equality comes from the de nition of T N 1 : The deviation payoff from investing at some before T N 1 is L N 1 . / < L N 1 .T N 1 /, hence this is an equilibrium. Next, we show that there is no other action pro le compatible with equilibrium. Suppose that 2 rms play "invest" at : The equilibrium payoff for any of these early investors is
Each of them could pro tably deviate by playing "wait" at ; since Proof. The result follows from Lemmata A.6 and A.7 by the induction principle.
Proof of Proposition 2.. First, suppose that the pro t structure is such that t j < t j C1 . By construction, t j solves,
. The numerator is positive, because t j < t j C1 . The denominator is positive as well, because in equilibrium t j < T j C1 . Therefore, t j is decreasing in .j /. Next, suppose instead that the pro t structure is such that t j D t j C1 . That is, suppose that the pro t structure is such that t j C1 T j . If a marginal change in .j / does not affect the inequality t j C1 T j , t j is affected only by the ow pro t parameters that affect t j C1 , hence it is constant in .j /. If instead a marginal change in .j / changes the inequality to t j C1 > T j , we fall into the previous case and t j decreases.
Proof of Proposition 3.. Suppose that for a given pro t structure , t j k < t j . We prove that there exists O
.j / such that for the modi ed game with pro t structure Q with Q .l/ D .l/ for all l j k and all l > j , Q .j / 2 . O .j / ; .j k// and Q .l/ > Q .l C 1/ for all l, investment times t j k and t j are clustered. For the pro t structure , let´ 1 be the number of investments occurring jointly in equilibrium at the beginning of the subgame played among the last N j C 1 players, so that t j D : : : D t j C´ 1 . Suppose´D 1. The proof of Proposition 2 shows that in this case t j strictly decreases in .j /. Moreover, lim .j /!.j k/ T j D T j k . Since t j < T j , there exists a O .j / large enough that t j < T j k in any modi ed game with pro t structure Q with Q .l/ D .l/ for all l j k and all l > j , Q .j / 2 . O .j /; .j k// and Q .l/ > Q .l C 1/ for all l. Now suppose that instead > 1. The fact that t j k < t j implies that T j k < t j D t j C´ 1 . Since T j is strictly decreasing in .j / and lim .j /!.j k/ T j D T j k < t j C´ 1 , there exists a N .j / suf ciently close to .j k/ such that T j < t j C1 D : : : D t j C´ 1 , and t j < T j < t j C1 in any modi ed game with pro t structure N with N .l/ D .l/ for all l j k and all l > j , N .j / 2 . N .j /; .j k// ; and N .l/ > N .l C 1/ for all l. Then, starting from the game with pro t structure N the proof for the case´D 1 applies.
